Trinity University

Digital Commons @ Trinity
Economics Faculty Research

Economics Department

10-2019

Some Considerations in Optimizing the Medical Physics Match
Richard V. Butler
Trinity University, rbutler@trinity.edu

John H. Huston
Trinity University, JHUSTON@TRINITY.EDU

G. Starkschall

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/econ_faculty
Part of the Economics Commons

Repository Citation
Butler, R.V., Huston, J., & Starkschall, G. (2019). Some considerations in optimizing the medical physics
match. Journal of Applied Clinical Medical Physics, 20(10), 4-5. doi:10.1002/acm2.12732

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at Digital Commons @ Trinity. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu.

Received: 4 September 2019

|

Accepted: 5 September 2019

DOI: 10.1002/acm2.12732

EDITORIAL

Some considerations in optimizing the Medical Physics Match
For several years, many medical physics educational programs in the

which the applicant compares the beneﬁts and costs of additional

United States and Canada have been participating in a residency

applications subject to a budget constraint. The search should stop

application matching program (MedPhys Match) in assigning gradu-

when the marginal beneﬁt of an additional application equals the

ates of CAMPEP‐accredited graduate programs to residency pro-

marginal cost (since we would expect the marginal beneﬁt to be

grams. Patterned after the National Resident Matching Program (The

declining and the marginal cost rising as a function of the number of

Match) for medical school graduates, the MedPhys Match is

applications). Presumably applicants would have a pretty decent

designed to maximize the satisfaction of the residency selection pro-

sense of what their cost function looks like; the challenge would be

cess for both the residency candidate and the residency program.

in quantifying the beneﬁt function since it is probabilistic. The mar-

Originally developed by Roth,1 the match algorithm requires the

ginal beneﬁt of applying to the applicant's nth program is a function

residency candidate to rank order residency programs and the resi-

of the probability of getting a match with that program. As n rises, it

dency programs to rank order residency candidates. The match algo-

is more and more likely that a match would already been achieved

rithm then tries to combine the highest ranking candidate with

with a higher ranked program and thus the probability of a match

highest ranking program. In 1962, Gale and Shapley demonstrated

with the nth program falls. The proof of this is as follows:

that this algorithm will always provide a stable solution. In 2012,

Imagine a list of possible residencies with the ﬁrst being the stu-

Roth and Shapley were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for

dent's favorite and the last being his/her least favorite. pi is the prob-

the matching algorithm.

ability of matching the ith residency on a student's list given that the

2

Several problems have arisen in the application of this algorithm to

student did not match with any his/her i‐1 other possible residencies.

the MedPhys Match. One problem is that the number of residents

So for the second residency, the probability of a match, Pi, is the

entering any given program is small. In 2018, a mean of 1.4 applicants

probability of not matching with the ﬁrst residency times the proba-

per program began residency training.3 A second problem is the imbal-

bility of matching the second P2 = (1 − p1)p2. For a student consid-

ance between the number of graduates applying to residency pro-

ering interviewing with the ith residency on the list the probability

grams and the number of residency positions. In 2018, 79% of

of matching is:

graduates of CAMPEP‐accredited graduate programs were accepted
into residency programs.4 Consequently, to ensure a match, candi-

Pi ¼ ð1  p1 Þð1  p2 Þð1  p3 Þ . . . . . . ð1  pi1 Þpi

dates interview at many programs. There is also a harmful feedback

Each of those terms is a fraction less than one, so as i rises, the

mechanism here. As applicants apply to more programs, the accep-

probability of matching falls. Since the student's list is organized in

tance rate at each program declines. Consequently, applicants may

order of preference, the beneﬁt of the ith position is also falls as i

apply to even more programs to increase their perceived probability of

increases. So the expected marginal beneﬁt PiBi declines as the stu-

acceptance into a program. This is costly for the candidates in terms of

dent interviews with additional residencies.

travel expenses, and costly for the interviewing faculty in terms of
time away from research, clinic, and teaching.

In recent times, the advent of electronic applications and online
job‐matching platforms has lowered the marginal cost of applying

The problem, then, that must be solved is to determine the optimal

almost to zero. This has led to huge increases in the number of

number of programs to which a prospective residency candidate

applicants that hiring universities must review. For example, in 2005

should apply. On one hand, applying to very few programs is desirable

a faculty vacancy in the Department of Economics at Trinity Univer-

because of the lower travel cost, but undesirable because of the lower

sity attracted 64 applicants for that position. Last year the Depart-

probability of being matched. On the other hand, applying to a large

ment had 536 candidates apply. Because it is impossible for a hiring

number of programs is undesirable because of the increased cost, but

committee to give careful consideration to that many applicants,

desirable because of the higher probability of being matched. The

institutions are looking for ways to reduce the ﬂood by, in effect,

solution to this problem is not easy to ﬁnd since the solution is likely

raising the marginal cost of applying. This can be accomplished by,

to be candidate‐speciﬁc. The purpose of this paper is to present some

for example, requiring candidates to provide answers to questions

factors that need to be taken into account in achieving a solution.

unique to that position. That seems to have helped a little. However,

Fundamentally, ﬁnding an applicant's optimal number of applications is a straightforward constrained maximization problem, in

if the number of medical physics graduates seeking residencies is
small, this may not be a useful solution.
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Because the problem of optimal applications is an economics

Dr Starkschall is Executive Secretary of the Commission on

problem, there has been a search for solutions and a developing lit-

Accreditation of Medical Physics Education Programs (CAMPEP).

erature on the subject. Balter et al.5 show that limiting the number

The opinions expressed in this article are his, and do not represent

of applications candidates can submit is superior to limiting the num-

any ofﬁcial position of CAMPEP.

ber of applications a program can evaluate. Entering an application

The Medical Physics Match has proven its usefulness to the

limit into the Gale/Shapley algorithm that underlies the matching

AAPM community, but it is not universally utilized for a variety of

process, the authors conclude that "the optimal limit in the number

reasons.

of applications balances the tradeoff between being unmatched and

This invited guest editorial explores the scholarly history of the

gaining a better match in the aggregate, and the beneﬁt can be con-

match algorithm and suggests some avenues to optimize its future

siderable if the graduates' preferences over the positions are not

use. It represents a ﬁrst for these pages as some of its authors are

very correlated." In other words, limiting the number of applications

professional economists while all are accomplished scholars. Michael

can actually result in better outcomes for the applicants as well as

D. Mills, Editor‐in‐Chief.

the lower costs for the institutions. One way to possibly identify
that limit is to take a sample of a few years' residency markets and
determine how far down their list the lower‐ranked candidates had

Richard V. Butler1

to go to get a match. Presumably, interviews beyond that point are
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very likely to have negative net beneﬁts.
Another approach to a solution is "signaling." A program would
be permitted to notify a small number (somewhere between three

1

Department of Economics, Trinity University, San Antonio, TX, USA
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and ﬁve) of applicants prior to interviews that it is seriously inter-

Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, TX, USA

ested in them. This gives the applicant useful information about his/
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her chances at that particular program and so makes the beneﬁt

Starkschall

function a bit less fuzzy. Because the problem in medical physics

E‐mails: gstarksc@mdanderson.org, Drstarkschall@gmail.com

seems to be more at the interview stage than the initial application
stage, some form of signaling by institutions offering residencies
might help reduce uncertainty so that at least some applicants could
focus on the places where they have good chance and pass on visits
to some of their more marginal options.
In conclusion, the problem of optimizing the number of residency
programs to which a medical physics graduate should apply is a cost‐
beneﬁt problem. The incremental cost of applying to an additional program is essentially the cost of travel to that program for an interview;
the beneﬁt has yet to be quantiﬁed. Strategies for mitigating the cost
of a large number of applications include limiting the number of programs to which a candidate may apply and/or allowing programs to
notify candidates if they are seriously interested in them.
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